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Abstract
The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strate-
gies for a team of rational players sharing the same goal
and without the capability of correlating their strategies in
strategic games against an adversary. This solution concept
can capture situations in which an agent controls multiple
resources—corresponding to the team members—that cannot
communicate. It is known that such equilibrium always ex-
ists and it is unique (unless degeneracy) and these properties
make it a credible solution concept to be used in real–world
applications, especially in security scenarios. Nevertheless,
to the best of our knowledge, the Team–maxmin equilib-
rium is almost completely unexplored in the literature. In this
paper, we investigate bounds of (in)efficiency of the Team–
maxmin equilibrium w.r.t. the Nash equilibria and w.r.t. the
Maxmin equilibrium when the team members can play cor-
related strategies. Furthermore, we study a number of algo-
rithms to find and/or approximate an equilibrium, discussing
their theoretical guarantees and evaluating their performance
by using a standard testbed of game instances.
Introduction
The computational study of game–theoretic solutions con-
cepts is among the most important challenges addressed
in the last decade of Computer Science (Deng, Papadim-
itriou, and Safra 2002). These problems acquired particu-
lar relevance in Artificial Intelligence, where the goal is
to design physical or software agents that must behave
optimally in strategic situations. In addition to the well–
known Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951), other solution con-
cepts received attention in the Artificial Intelligence litera-
ture thanks to their application in security domains. Exam-
ples include Maxmin equilibrium for zero–sum games un-
der various forms of constraints over the actions of the play-
ers (Jain et al. 2010) and Stackelberg (a.k.a. leader–follower)
equilibrium (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006).
While a large part of the literature focuses on 2–player
games, few results are known about games with more
players—except for games with a very specific structure,
e.g., congestion games (Nisan et al. 2007). In this paper, we
focus on the Team–maxmin equilibrium proposed by (von
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Stengel and Koller 1997). It applies to zero–sum games be-
tween a team and an adversary. The team is defined as a
set of players with the same utility function UT and with-
out the capability of synchronizing their actions. The ad-
versary is a single player with utility function ´UT . These
games can model many realistic security scenarios, for ex-
ample those where multiple non–coordinating agents share
the common objective of defending an environment against
a malicious attacker. In (Jiang et al. 2013), a security setting
of such type is studied and an analysis of the price of mis–
coordination in the specific proposed security games is con-
ducted. The Team–maxmin equilibrium plays a crucial role
also in infinitely repeated games and role assignment prob-
lems (Moon and Conitzer 2016), where it is necessary to
compute threat points. The current approach to tackle these
problems, in games with more than two players, is consid-
ering the correlated threat point (Kontogiannis and Spirakis
2008) or employing approximating algorithms that avoid the
use of linear programming (Andersen and Conitzer 2013).
Our techniques allow the computation punishment strategies
(leading to the threat points) in the general scenario in which
players, other than the defector, cannot coordinate strategy
execution.
The study of Team–maxmin equilibrium is almost com-
pletely unexplored. It is known that it always exists, it is
unique except for degeneracies, and it is the best Nash equi-
librium for the team, but, to the best of our knowledge, only
two computational works deal with this solution concept.
(Borgs et al. 2010) show that the Minmax value (equiva-
lently the Team–maxmin value) is inapproximable in addi-
tive sense within 3m2 even in 3–player games with m ac-
tions per player and binary payoffs (but nothing is known
about the membership to APX class or some super class);
(Hansen et al. 2008) strengthen the previous complexity re-
sult and provide a quasi–polynomial time –approximation
(in additive sense) algorithm. Only (Lim 1997; Alpern and
Lim 1998) deal with the mathematical derivation for a spe-
cific class of games with an adversary, i.e., rendezvous–
evasion games. Instead, a number of works deal with team
games without adversary. We just cite a few for the sake
of completeness. Team games were first proposed in (Pal-
frey and Rosenthal 1983) as voting games, then studied in
repeated and absorbing games to understand the interac-
tion among the players (Bornstein, Erev, and Goren 1994;
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Bornstein, Winter, and Goren 1996; Bornstein, Budescu,
and Zamir 1997; Solan 2000) and more recently in Markov
games with noisy payoffs (Wang and Sandholm 2002).
Original contributions We provide two main contribu-
tions. First, we study the relationship, in terms of effi-
ciency for the team, between Nash equilibrium (i.e., when
players are not teammates), Team–maxmin equilibrium,
and Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium (i.e., the Maxmin
equilibrium when all the team members can play in corre-
lated strategies and then can synchronize the execution of
their actions). We show that, even in the same instances
with binary payoffs, the worst Nash equilibrium may be ar-
bitrarily worse than the Team–maxmin equilibrium that, in
its turn, may be arbitrarily worse (in this case only asymp-
totically) than the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium.
We provide exact bounds for the inefficiency and we de-
sign an algorithm that, given a correlated strategy of the
team, returns in polynomial time a mixed strategy of the
team minimizing the worst–case ratio between the utility
given by the correlated strategy and the utility given by the
mixed strategy. Second, we provide some algorithms to find
and/or approximate the Team–maxmin equilibrium, we dis-
cuss their theoretical guarantees and evaluate them in prac-
tice by means of a standard testbed (Nudelman et al. 2004).
We also identify the limits of such algorithms and discuss
which ones are the best to be adopted depending on the in-
stance to be solved. For the sake of presentation, the proofs
of the theorems are presented in the Appendices.
Preliminaries
A normal–form game is a tuple pN,A,Uq where: N “
t1, 2, . . . , nu is the set of players; A “ ŚiPN Ai is the
set of player i’s actions, where Ai “ ta1, a2, . . . , amiu;
U “ tU1, U2, . . . , Unu is the utility function of player i,
where Ui : A Ñ R. A strategy profile is defined as s “
ps1, s2, . . . , snq, where si P ∆pAiq is player i’s mixed strat-
egy and ∆pAiq is the set of all the probability distributions
over Ai. As customary, ´i denotes the set containing all the
players except player i. We study games in which the set
of players T “ t1, 2, . . . , n ´ 1u constitutes a team whose
members have the same utility function UT . Player n is an
adversary of the team and her utility function is ´UT .
When the teammates cannot coordinate at all and there-
fore no player can communicate with the others, and each
player takes decisions independently, the appropriate solu-
tion concept is the Nash equilibrium, which prescribes a
strategy profile where each player i’s strategy si is a best re-
sponse to s´i. In 2–player zero–sum games, a Nash equilib-
rium is a pair of Maxmin/Minmax strategies and can be com-
puted in polynomial time. In arbitrary games, the computa-
tion of a Nash equilibrium is PPAD–complete even when
the number of players is fixed (Daskalakis, Goldberg, and
Papadimitriou 2009). Instead, when the teammates can co-
ordinate themselves, we distinguish two forms of coordi-
nations: correlated, in which a correlating device decides
a joint action (i.e., an action profile specifying one action
per teammate) and then communicates each teammate her
action, and non–correlated, in which each player plays in-
dependently from the others.
When the coordination is non–correlated, players are sub-
ject to the inability of correlating their actions, and their
strategy si is mixed, as defined above for a generic normal–
form game. In other words, teammates can jointly decide
their strategies, but they cannot synchronize their actions,
which must then be drawn independently. The appropriate
solution concept for such setting is the Team–maxmin equi-
librium.
A Team–maxmin equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with
the properties of being unique (except for degeneracies)
and the best one for the team. These property are very ap-
pealing in real–world settings, since they allow to avoid
the equilibrium selection problem which affects the Nash
equilibrium. In security applications, for instance, the equi-
librium uniqueness allows to perfectly forecast the behav-
ior of the attacker (adversary). When the number of play-
ers is given, finding a Team–maxmin equilibrium is FNP–
hard and the Team–maxmin value is inapproximable in ad-
ditive sense even when the payoffs are binary (Hansen et
al. 2008). 1 In (Hansen et al. 2008), the authors provide a
quasi–polynomial–time –approximation (in additive sense)
algorithm. Furthermore, a Team–maxmin equilibrium may
contain irrational probabilities even with 2 teammates and 3
different values of payoffs.2 It is not known any experimen-
tal evaluation of algorithms for finding the Team–maxmin
equilibrium.
When players can synchronize their actions, the team
strategy is said to be correlated. Given the set of team action
profiles defined as AT “ ŚiPT Ai, a correlated team strat-
egy is defined as p P ∆pAT q. In other words, teammates can
jointly decide and execute their strategy. The team is then
equivalent to a single player whose actions are joint team ac-
tion profiles. In such case, the appropriate solution concept
for the team and the adversary is a pair of Maxmin/Minmax
strategies that, for the sake of clarity, we call in this paper
Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium. This equilibrium can
be found by means of linear programming since it can be
formulated as a maxmin problem in which the max player’s
action space is given by the Cartesian product of the action
space of each teammate. Notice that the size of the input
is exponential in the number of teammates and therefore ap-
proximation algorithms for games with many team members
are necessary in practice.
Furthermore, it is not known the price—in terms of
inefficiency—paid by a team due to the inability of syn-
chronizing the execution of their actions. This would allow
to understand how the Team–maxmin equilibrium is inef-
ficient w.r.t. the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium, or
equivalently, how well the Team-maxmin equilibrium ap-
proximates the Correlated-team maxmin equilibrium. An-
other open problem is studying the gain a set of players shar-
1Rigorously speaking, (Hansen et al. 2008) studies Minmax
strategy when there is a single max player and multiple min play-
ers. The problem of finding the Team–maxmin equilibrium in zero–
sum adversarial team games can be formulated as the problem of
finding such Minmax strategy and vice versa.
2The proof, provided in (Hansen et al. 2008), contains a minor
flaw. In the Appendices, we provide a correct revision of the proof
with all the calculations, omitted in the original proof.
ing the same goal would have in forming a team and coor-
dinating their mixed strategies (i.e., how is the Nash equi-
librium inefficient w.r.t. the Team-maxmin equilibrium, or
equivalently, how well the Nash equilibrium approximates
the Team-maxmin equilibrium).
Nash, Team-maxmin, and
Correlated–team maxmin equilibria
We study the relationships between Nash equilibrium and
Team–maxmin equilibrium in terms of efficiency for the
team. In our analysis, we resort to the concept of Price of
Anarchy (POA), showing that Nash equilibrium—precisely,
the worst case Nash equilibrium—may be arbitrarily ineffi-
cient w.r.t. the Team–maxmin equilibrium—corresponding
to the best Nash equilibrium for the team. In this case the
POA provides a measure about the inefficiency that a group
of players with the same goal would have if they do not
form a team. To have coherent results with the definition
of POA, we consider games with payoffs in the range r0, 1s.
We observe that our results will hold without loss of gen-
erality since, given any arbitrary game, we can produce an
equivalent game in which the payoffs are in such a range by
using an affine transformation. Furthermore, for the sake of
presentation, we consider only games in which m1 “ . . . “
mn “ m. The generalization of our results when players
may have a different number of actions is straightforward.
Theorem 1 The Price of Anarchy (POA) of the Nash equi-
librium w.r.t. the Team–maxmin equilibrium may be POA“
8 even in games with 3 players (2 teammates), 2 actions per
player, and binary payoffs.
In order to evaluate the inefficiency of the Team–maxmin
equilibrium w.r.t. the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium,
we introduce a new index similar to the mediation value pro-
posed in (Ashlagi, Monderer, and Tennenholtz 2008) and
following the same rationale of the POA. We call such an
index Price of Uncorrelation (POU) and we define it as the
ratio between the team’s utility provided by the Correlated–
team maxmin equilibrium and that one provided by the
Team–maxmin equilibrium. POU provides a measure of the
inefficiency due to the impossibility, for the teammates, of
synchronizing the execution of their strategies.
Definition 1 Let us consider an n–player game. The Price
of Uncorrelation (POU) is defined as POU “ vteamCvteamM ě 1
where vteamC is Correlated–team maxmin value of the team
and vteamM is Team–maxmin value of the team.
We initially provide a lower bound over the worst–case
POU.
Theorem 2 The POU of the Team–maxmin equilibrium
w.r.t. the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium may be
POU“ mn´2 even in games with binary payoffs.
Now, we provide an upper bound over the worst–case
POU.
Theorem 3 Given any n–player game and a Correlated–
team maxmin equilibrium with a utility of v for the team, it is
always possible to find in polynomial time a mixed strategy
profile for the team providing a utility of at least vmn´2 to the
team and therefore POU is never larger than mn´2.
We observe that Theorem 7 shows that the upper bound
of POU is at least mn´2, while Theorem 8 shows that POU
cannot be larger than mn´2. Therefore, POU is arbitrarily
large only asymptotically. In other words, POU “ 8 only
when m or n go to 8.3 More importantly, the proof of
Theorem 8 provides a polynomial–time algorithm to find
a mixed strategy of the team given a correlated strategy
and this algorithm is the best possible algorithm in terms
of worst–case minimization of POU. The algorithm is sim-
ple and computes mixed strategies for the team members
as follows. Given the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium
p P ∆pA1ˆ . . .ˆAn´1q, the mixed strategy of player 1 ps1q
is such that each action a1 is played with the probability that
a1 is chosen in p, that is s1pa1q “ řa´1PA´1 ppa1, a´1q.
Every other team member i P Nzt1, nu plays uniformly
over the actions she plays with strictly positive probability
in p. Since the computation of a Correlated–team maxmin
equilibrium can be done in polynomial time, such an algo-
rithm is a polynomial–time approximation algorithm for the
Team–maxmin equilibrium.
Furthermore, notice that POU rises polynomially in the
number of actions m and exponentially in the number of
players n. Interestingly, the instances used in the proof of
Theorem 7 generalize the instances used in the proof of The-
orem 6. Indeed, it can be observed that the POA of the Nash
equilibrium w.r.t. the Team–maxmin equilibrium is8 in the
instances used in the proof of Theorem 7. Therefore, there
are instances in which the worst Nash equilibrium is arbi-
trarily worse than the Team–maxmin equilibrium and, in
its turn, the Team–maxmin equilibrium is arbitrarily worse
(in this case only asymptotically) than the Correlated–team
maxmin equilibrium.
For the sake of completeness, we state the following re-
sult, showing the lower bound of POU.
Theorem 4 The POU of the Team–maxmin equilibrium
w.r.t. the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium may be
POU“ 1 even in games with binary payoffs.
Algorithms to find and/or approximate a
Team-maxmin equilibrium
In the following, we describe four algorithms to
find/approximate the Team–maxmin equilibrium.
Global optimization The problem of finding the Team–
maxmin equilibrium can be formulated as a non–linear non–
convex mathematical program as follows:
3A more accurate bound can be obtained by substitutingmwith
the size of the equilibrium support, showing that the inefficiency
increases as the equilibrium support increases.
Algorithm 1 SupportEnumeration
1: v˚ “ `8
2: for all i P T do
3: Pi “ tpV 1i ,m1i q, pV 2i ,m2i q, . . . | @j, V ji Ď Ai,
ř
aPVi
mji paq “ Γu
4: C “ŚiPT Pi
5: for all
`pV1,m1q, pV2,m2q, . . . , pVn´1,mn´1q˘ P C do
6: for all i P T do
7: sipaiq “
$&%
mipaiq
Γ , if ai P Vi
0 otherwise
8: v˚ “ maxtv˚,min
sn
UT ps1, s2, . . . , sn´1qu
9: return v˚
max
v,si
v
s.t. v ´ ÿ
aT PAT
UT paT , anq
ź
iPT
sipaiq ď 0 @an P An
ÿ
aiPAi
sipaiq “ 1 @i P T
sipaiq ě 0 @i P T, ai P Ai
In order to find an exact (within a given accuracy) Team–
maxmin equilibrium, we resort to global optimization tools.
Global optimization obviously requires exponential time.
In particular, we use BARON (Tawarmalani and Sahinidis
2005) solver, since it is the best performing solver for com-
pletely continuous problems among all the existing global
optimization solvers (Neumaier et al. 2005). Most impor-
tantly, BARON, if terminated prematurely, returns a lower
bound, corresponding to the value of the best solution found
so far, and an upper bound, corresponding to the tightest up-
per bound over the Team–maxmin value found so far.
Reconstruction from correlated strategies We approxi-
mate the Team–maxmin equilibrium by using a simple vari-
ation of the algorithm described previously to find a mixed
strategy from a correlated one. First, the algorithm finds a
Correlated–team maxmin by means of linear programming.
Second, we derive the mixed strategy. The algorithm can
be parametrized by exchanging player 1 with each player
of the team. This leads to n ´ 1 different mixed strategies
from the same correlated strategy. The algorithm returns the
best one for the team. Since the Correlated–team maxmin
equilibrium is always better than the Team–maxmin equi-
librium, this algorithm assures an approximation factor of at
least 1mn´2 showing that the problem is in Poly–APX when
n is given.
Support enumeration In (Hansen et al. 2008), the authors
show how in n–players finite strategic games the minmax
value of a player can be approximated (from above) within
an arbitrary additive error  ą 0. The algorithmic approach
to guarantee such approximation leverages the concept of
simple strategies as introduced in (Lipton and Young 1994)
and can be exploited to approximate the Team–maxmin
value, as we fully report in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 IteratedLP
1: @i P T , scuri Ð sˆi
2: repeat
3: for all i P T do
4:
v˚i “ max vi
vi ď ř
aT PAT
xaiUT paT , anq
ś
jPT ztiu
scurj pajq @an P Anř
aiPAi
xai “ 1 @ai P Ai :
xai ě 0
5: i1 “ arg max
iPT v
˚
i
6: scuri paiq “
$&%x˚ai if i “ i1scuri paiq otherwise
7: until convergence or timeout
8: return scur
The algorithm enumerates joint action multi–sets (spec-
ifying, for each player i, a subset of actions that can con-
tain duplicate elements) of cardinality Γ “ P ln |Ai|22 T. The
strategy for each player is then obtained from an uniform
distribution over the considered multi–set (for example, if
action ai has k duplicates it will be selected with probability
k{Γ). The adversary’s best response and the corresponding
value for the team is then computed. The algorithm returns
the joint support maximizing the value of the team. With
a slight adaptation of the analysis made in (Hansen et al.
2008), it can be easily shown that Algorithm 1 approximates
the Team–maxmin value with additive error of at most with
a number of iterations equal to
`
m`Γ´1
Γ
˘n´1
.
In the table below we report, for some m, the number of
iterations required by the algorithm to assure a given approx-
imation with additive error not larger than .
m 5 5 5 10 10 10
 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.1
iterations ą 24 ą 212 ą 241 ą 211 ą 221 ą 287
As it can be seen, the algorithm can provide only a coarse
guarantee (in additive sense) in small games, requiring how-
ever a large number of iterations.
Iterating linear programming In Algorithm 2 we pro-
pose a method we call IteratedLP based on solving it-
eratively a Maxmin problem between 2 players (a member
of the team and the adversary) by linear programming.
It works by maintaining a current solution scur which
specifies a strategy for each team member. It is initialized
(Line 1) with a starting solution sˆ which, in principle, can
prescribe an arbitrary set of strategies for the team (e.g.,
uniform randomizations). Then for each team member i
(Line 3), we instantiate and solve the specified linear pro-
gram (Line 4). The decision variables of this LP are vi and,
for each action ai of player i, xai . We maximize vi subject
to the upper bound given by the first constraint, where we
assumed that the strategy of player i (relabeled with x to dis-
tinguish it) is a variable while the strategies of the other team
members are constants, set to the associated value specified
by the current solution. (Notice that, in the LP, aj is the ac-
tion that team member j plays in the team action profile aT ).
The optimal solution of the LP is given by vi˚ and x
˚, rep-
resenting the Maxmin strategy of team member i once the
strategies of teammates have been fixed to the current solu-
tion. Once the LP has been solved for each i, the algorithm
updates the current solution in the following way (Line 6):
the strategy of the team member that obtained the best LP
optimal solution is replaced with the corresponding strategy
from the LP. This process continuously iterates until con-
vergence or until some timeout is met. At each iteration of
the algorithm, the value of the game increases (non–strictly)
monotonically. We run it using multiple random restarts, i.e.,
generating a set of different initial assignments sˆ (Line 1).
Once convergence is achieved, we pass to the next random
restart generating a new strategy profile for the team.
A crucial question is whether there are initializations that
are better or worse than others. We can prove the following.
Theorem 5 When the algorithm is initialized with a uni-
form strategy for every player, the worst–case approxima-
tion factor of Algorithm 2 is at least 1mn´1 and at most
1
mn´2 .
When instead the algorithm is initialized with a pure strat-
egy, the worst–case approximation factor is 0.
We leave open the problem of studying how the worst–
case approximation factor varies for other initializations.
Experimental evaluation
Experimental setting
Our experimental setting is based on instances of
RandomGames class generated by GAMUT (Nudelman et
al. 2004). Specifically, once a game instance is generated,
we extract the utility function of player 1 and assign it to all
the team members. Furthermore, in each generated game in-
stance, the payoffs are between 0 and 1. We use 100 game in-
stances for each combination of n andmwhere n P t3, 4, 5u
and m is as follows:
m “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
5 to 40, step “ 5, n “ 3
50 to 150, step “ 10, n “ 3
5 to 50, step “ 5, n “ 4
5 to 30, step “ 5, n “ 5
.
Algorithms are implemented in Python 2.7.6, adopting
GUROBI 6.5.0 (Gurobi Optimization 2015) for linear math-
ematical programs, AMPL 20160310 (Fourer, Gay, and
Kernighan 1989) and BARON 14.4.0 (Tawarmalani and
Sahinidis 2005; Sahinidis 2014) for global optimization pro-
grams. We set a timeout of 60 minutes for the resolution of
each instance. All the algorithms are executed on a UNIX
computer with 2.33GHz CPU and 128 GB RAM.
Experimental results
Global optimization The average quality of the solutions
is reported in Fig. 1 in terms of ratio between the lower
(a.k.a. primal) bound and the upper (a.k.a. dual) bound re-
turned by BARON once terminated. When BARON finds
the optimal solution (up to an accuracy of 10´9), the lower
bound equals the upper bound achieving a ratio of 1. This
happens with n “ 3 up to m “ 15 (except for some out-
liers), with n P t4, 5u and m “ 5. For larger instances with
n “ 3 up to m “ 130, with n “ 4 up to m “ 45 and
with n “ 5 up to m “ 20, BARON returns an approximate
solution with a ratio always larger than 0.7. With n “ 3
and m P t140, 150u, BARON returns a very high upper
bound such that the ratio is close to zero. With larger in-
stances, BARON does not run due to memory limits. Hence,
BARON demonstrates to be an excellent tool to approximate
the Team–maxmin equilibrium especially with n “ 3 (note
that, with n “ 3 and m “ 130, the number of outcomes is
larger than 2 millions).
l l l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l l0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 50 100 150
Number of actions
R
at
io
 (B
AR
O
N 
lo
w
e
r 
bo
un
d 
/ B
AR
O
N 
up
pe
r b
ou
nd
)
Number of players:
l 3
4
5
Figure 1: Average (empiric) approximation ratio (lower
bound / upper bound) of the solutions returned by BARON.
Other algorithms We report in Fig. 2 the average perfor-
mance of the other three algorithms described in the pre-
vious section in terms of ratio between team value of the
strategy returned by each single algorithm and the lower
bound returned by BARON. A ratio smaller than 1 means
that the given algorithm provides a solution with a quality
worse than the solution returned by BARON.
Let us focus on the reconstruction from correlated strate-
gies. This algorithm solves all the instances of our exper-
imental settings, including also the instances that BARON
does not solve due to memory limits. However, the quality
of the solutions is always worse than the solutions returned
by BARON. More precisely, we notice that the ratio is al-
ways larger than 0.6 and, with n “ 3, it is larger than 0.8.
Hence, the quality of the solutions w.r.t. the upper bound of
BARON is always larger than 0.5, thus achieving at least
1{2 of the Team–maxmin value. As expected, the quality
decreases as the number of players increases. Instead, sur-
prisingly, the quality increases as the number of actions per
player increases (we provide a motivation for that below).
Let us focus on the support enumeration algorithm.
We report the performance of the algorithm for  P
t0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00u. As expected, the algorithm
does not scale. Indeed, when  is set ă 1, the algorithm ter-
minates only for m ď 20 with n “ 3, and only for m “ 5
with n P t4, 5u. This shows that the algorithm can be practi-
cally applied only when  “ 1, but this corresponds not pro-
viding any theoretical bound (indeed, since all the payoffs
are between 0 and 1, any strategy profile has an additive gap
no larger than 1). However, even when  “ 1, the algorithm
terminates only for m ď 50 with n “ 3, for m ď 15 with
n “ 4, and for m “ 5 with n “ 5, that is a strictly smaller
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(a) 3–players Reconstruction from correlated
strategies.
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(b) 3–players Support enumeration.
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(c) 3–players Iterating linear programming.
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(d) 4–players Reconstruction from correlated
strategies.
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(e) 4–players Support enumeration.
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(f) 4–players Iterating linear programming.
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(g) 5–players Reconstruction from correlated
strategies.
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(h) 5–players Support enumeration.
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(i) 5–players Iterating linear programming.
Figure 2: Average approximation performance of the proposed algorithms w.r.t. global optimization.
subset of instances than the subset solved by BARON. The
quality of the solutions returned by the algorithm is rather
good, but it is always worse than the solutions returned by
BARON. Finally, notice that, differently from the previous
algorithm, in the case of n “ 3, the quality of the solution
decreases as the number of action increases.
Let us focus on the iterated linear programming. We
report the performance of the algorithm for a number of
random restarts in t1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100u.
This algorithm solves all the instances of our experimental
settings, including also the instances that BARON does not
solve due to memory limits. Also in this case, the quality of
the solutions is always worse than the solutions returned by
BARON. Notice that the ratio is very high and very close
to 1 for n “ 3. Interestingly, the number of restarts affects
the solution quality essentially only when m is small. Obvi-
ously, when m is large, the number of restarts performed by
the algorithm reduces, but, surprisingly, the solution qual-
ity increases and it is almost the same for every number of
restarts. We observe that the number of restarts performed
with the largest instances is 30 with n P t3, 4u and 10 with
n “ 5. This algorithm provides the best approximation w.r.t.
the previous two algorithms.
Summary Global optimization (BARON) provides the
best approximate solutions, but it does not solve all the in-
stances of the experimental setting due to memory limits.
The algorithm iterating linear programming allows one to
solve larger instances with a relatively small loss in terms of
utility. Furthermore, approximating the Team–maxmin equi-
librium gets easier as the number of actions per player in-
creases. We observe that this may happen because, as the
number of actions per player increases, the probability that
the Team–maxmin equilibrium has a small support increases
and small supported equilibria should be easier to be found.
Price of Uncorrelation Finally, we empirically evaluate
POU in our experimental setting. We do that by calculating
the ratio between the value of the Correlated–team maxmin
equilibrium—computed exactly—and the lower bound re-
tuned by BARON, which is the algorithm returning always
the best approximation of the Team–maxmin equilibrium.
This ratio is obviously an upper bound of the actual POU.
In Fig. 3, we report the average ratio and the corresponding
box plot. Surprisingly, the ratio is very close to 1 even for
n “ 5, while, we recall, the worst–case ratio is mn´2. It
can be observed that the ratio is monotonically increasing
in n, while the dependency on m is not monotone: there is
a maximum small values of m and then the ratio decreases
as m increases. For instance, in 3–players games, the ratio
goes asymptotically to about 1.15, showing that the loss is
very small empirically. Unexpectedly, this shows that, on av-
erage, the loss due to the inability for a team of correlating
their strategies is rather small.
l
l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
0 50 100 150
Number of actions
Po
U
Number of players:
l 3
4
5
(a) Average
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
Number of actions
Po
U
Number of players:
3
4
5
(b) Boxplot
Figure 3: Empiric Price of Uncorrelation.
Specific game classes Our Appendices includes addi-
tional experiments assessing, analogously to what done in
this section with RandomGames, empirical approximation
performances and Price of Uncorrelation.
These additional results substantially confirm global op-
timization as the best approach for games of small size,
while IteratedLP keeps providing an approximation ra-
tio close to the optimum even with complex game in-
stances. Moreover, by generating random games from
specific classes, it is possible to observe an interesting
set of worst–case instances from the class Travelers
Dilemma. For those games BARON, although keeping to
be the best among the other algorithms, provided low empir-
ical approximation factors suggesting how Team–maxmin
could be hard to approximate for such class. The Price of
Uncorrelation shows a similar trend of that of Fig. 3 for
all classes but Bertrand Oligopoly. For these games,
results seem to suggest that correlation becomes more and
more critical as the number of players’ actions increases.
Conclusions
The Team–maxmin equilibrium is an important solution
concept requiring deep algorithmic studies. In this work,
we studied its efficiency w.r.t. Nash equilibrium and the
Maxmin equilibrium with correlated team strategies. More-
over, we proposed algorithms to compute/approximate it,
deriving theoretical guarantees and empirical evaluations.
In future, we will deal with Team–maxmin equilibrium
in specific games like polymatrix games and congestion
games.
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Appendices
Proofs of the Theorems
Theorem 6 The Price of Anarchy (POA) of the Nash equi-
librium w.r.t. the Team–maxmin equilibrium may be POA“
8 even in games with 3 players (2 teammates), 2 actions per
player, and binary payoffs for the team.
Proof. Consider the following game instance with 3 players
(2 teammates), 2 actions per player, and binary payoffs for
the team:
2
a3 a4
1 a1 1 0
a2 0 0
2
a3 a4
1 a1 0 0
a2 0 1
a5 a6
3
Team–maxmin equilibrium. Consider the strategy profile
in which:
s1 “
"
a1 0.5
a2 0.5
, s2 “
"
a3 0.5
a4 0.5
, s3 “
"
a5 0.5
a6 0.5
.
It is a Nash equilibrium providing each teammate a utility
of 0.25. Indeed, player 1 is indifferent between playing ac-
tions a1 and a2, each action providing a utility of 0.25. The
same holds for the other two players: player 2 is indifferent
between playing actions a3 and a4, each action providing a
utility of 0.25, and player 3 is indifferent between playing
actions a5 and a6, each action providing a utility of ´0.25.
Worst Nash equilibrium. Consider the action profiles
pa2, a4, a5q and pa1, a3, a6q. They are Nash equilibria pro-
viding the team a utility of 0. Indeed, consider pa2, a4, a5q,
player 1 would gain 0 from unilateral deviations and the
same for player 2, while player 3 would lose utility (from
1 to 0) from unilateral deviations.
POA. As a result, the ratio between the value of the team
provided by the Team–maxmin equilibrium and the worst
Nash equilibrium is POA“ 0.250 “ 8. l
Theorem 7 The Price of Uncorrelation (POU) of the Team–
maxmin equilibrium w.r.t. the Correlated–team maxmin
equilibrium may be POU“ mn´2 even in games with bi-
nary payoffs for the team.
Proof. Consider the game instances with n players (n ´ 1
teammates) and m actions per player in which the utility of
the team is:
UT pa1, . . . , anq “
"
1 a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an
0 otherwise
,
Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium. The equilibrium
strategy profile prescribes the team plays all the join actions
of the form a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1, each action played with
a probability of 1m . The utility for the team is
1
m . First, we
observe that the team cannot improve its utility by playing
with strictly positive probability the other joint actions. This
easily follows from the fact that all the other actions provide
a utility of zero to the team for every action of the adversary,
resulting thus weakly dominated. Second, we observe that
all the joint actions of the form a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1 must
be played with strictly positive probability. Indeed, suppose
that the team plays with zero probability a joint action of the
form a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1 “ a. Then, if the adversary
plays a, the team receives a utility of 0. Finally, given that
all the joint actions of the form a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1 are
played with strictly positive probability, the probability over
them is uniform by symmetry.
Team maxmin equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy pro-
file prescribes each player to play every action with a prob-
ability of 1m . The utility of the team is
1
mn´1 . Initially, we
observe that if some player does not play with strictly posi-
tive probability at least an action, say a, then the utility of
the team is zero. Indeed, in such a case, if the adversary
plays a, the utility of the team is zero. Finally, given that
every player plays with strictly positive probability all the
actions, the probability over them is uniform by symmetry.
POU. As a result, the ratio between the value of the team
provided by the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium and
Team–maxmin equilibrium is POU“ 1{m1{mn´1 “ mn´2. l
Theorem 8 Given any n–player game and a Correlated–
team maxmin equilibrium with a utility of v for the team, it is
always possible to find in polynomial time a mixed strategy
profile for the team providing a utility of at least vmn´2 to the
team.
Proof. Consider the following simple algorithm. Call p
the correlated strategy of the team at the Correlated–team
maxmin equilibrium—generically, p is a function p P
∆pA1 ˆ . . . ˆ An´1q where ∆pSq is the set of all proba-
bility distributions over set S. The mixed strategy si with
i P Nztnu is obtained as follows:
• for every a1 P A1, we set
s1pa1q “
ÿ
pa2,...an´1qPA2ˆ...ˆAn´1
ppa1, a2, . . . , an´1q.
Notice that the strategy is well defined, summing to 1
since
ř
aPA1ˆ...An´1 ppaq “ 1;
• for every i P Nzt1, nu and for every ai P Ai, we set
sipaiq “
"
0 Ea´n : ai P a´n and ppa´nq ą 0
1{|suppi| otherwise ;
where |suppi| is the number of actions of i played with
strictly positive probability by p. Notice that also in this
case the strategy is well defined, summing to 1.
In words, the mixed strategy si is built such that: s1 plays
each action a1 with the probability that a1 is chosen by p,
while si with i P Nzt1, nu plays action ai with a proba-
bility of 1 divided by the number of actions of i played by
strictly positive probability by p if a is played by p and with
a probability of 0 otherwise. We show that the strategy pro-
file ps1, . . . , s´nq always assures (against an adversary) the
team to receive at least vmn´2 where v is the utility given by
the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium. For the sake of
the presentation, we distinguish some cases.
Case 1: for every team member i, each action ai is played
with positive strictly probability in p and there is only one
joint action of the team played with strictly positive proba-
bility that contains ai. In this case, once an opportune re–
labeling of the actions is performed, the correlated strategy
p puts strictly positive probability only to joint actions of
the form a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1 and to all such joint
actions. First, we show that our s plays each joint action
a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1 such that ppa1, . . . , a´nq ą
0 with ppa1, . . . , a´nq{mn´2. This is because s1pa1q “
ppa1, . . . , a´nq, while s2pa2q “ . . . “ sn´1pan´1q “ 1m .
Second, the worst case, which minimizes the utility of the
team when a mixed strategy is used, is when the payoffs
of all the outcomes achievable with the joint actions played
with zero probability by p are zero. This means that the only
joint actions providing strictly positive expected utility to
the team are those played with strictly positive probability
by p. Strategy s prescribes over such joint actions the same
probability of p divided by mn´2. Therefore, the strategy of
the adversary does not change and the utility for the team
provided by the mixed strategy s is 1{mn´2 multiplied by
the utility given by the Correlated–team maxmin equilib-
rium. When the payoffs of the outcomes achievable by the
joint actions played with zero probability by p have strictly
positive values, the expected utility for the team given by
s is obviously larger than 1{mn´2 multiplied by the util-
ity given by the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium. This
completes the proof of the theorem for this case.
Case 2: for every team member i, each action ai is played
with positive strictly probability in p and there may be more
than one joint action of the team played with strictly pos-
itive probability that contains ai. In this case, the proof is
exactly the same of the previous case except we notice that
the probability with which a joint action pa1, . . . , a´nq with
ppa1, . . . , a´nq ą 0 is played by s is strictly larger than
ppa1,...,a´nq
mn´2 . We provide a simple example. Suppose that ac-
tion a1 belongs to 2 joint actions played with strictly positive
probability by p, say a1 and a2. The, s1pa1q “ ppa1q`ppp2q.
Therefore, the probability with joint action a1 is played by s
is ppa
1q`ppa2q
mn´2 ą ppa
1q
mn´2 . Therefore, the utility given to the
team by s is, except degeneracies, strictly larger than 1mn´2
multiplied by the utility of the Correlated–team maxmin
equilibrium.
Case 3: no restriction. In this case, the proof is exactly the
same of the previous case except that the probability with
which a joint action pa1, . . . , a´nq with ppa1, . . . , a´nq ą 0
is played by s is strictly larger than ppa1,...,a´nqmn´2 . This fol-
lows from the fact that the strategy of team members i with
i ą 1 may prescribe to play actions ai with a probability
larger than 1{m, since |suppi| may be smaller than m. This
completes the proof. l
Theorem 9 The POU of the Team–maxmin equilibrium
w.r.t. the Correlated–team maxmin equilibrium may be
POU“ 1 even in games with binary payoffs.
Proof. To find a suitable example, it suffices to consider a
game instance with an equilibrium in pure strategies. Con-
sider, for example, the following game instance with 3 play-
ers (2 teammates), 2 actions per player, and binary payoffs
for the team:
2
a3 a4
1 a1 1 0
a2 0 1
2
a3 a4
1 a1 1 0
a2 0 1
a5 a6
3
Consider any strategy profile where players 1 and 2 play
with probability 1 actions a1 and a3, respectively. For any
strategy of player 3 this is an equilibrium profile that yields
to the team a probability of 1 independently from the avail-
ability of correlation between them. l
Theorem 10 When the algorithm is initialized with a uni-
form strategy for every player, the worst–case approxima-
tion factor of Algorithm 2 is at least 1mn´1 and at most
1
mn´2 .
When instead the algorithm is initialized with a pure strat-
egy, the worst–case approximation factor is 0.
Proof. We prove that, when every team player plays a uni-
form strategy, the value of the team is almost 1mn´1 of the
value of the Team–maxmin equilibrium. Consider initially
the worst case in which the Team–maxmin equilibrium is
pure giving a value v to the team. When a uniform strategy
is used by every player, each outcome is played with a prob-
ability of at least 1mn´1 , including the equilibrium outcome.
In the worst case, all the outcomes except the equilibrium
provide a utility of zero to the team, and therefore the team
receives a utility of vmn´1 . In the case in which the Team–
maxmin equilibrium is mixed, the proof is similar.
Now, we prove that there is some case in which the
algorithm returns an approximation of 1mn´2 . Consider a
team game where the team is composed by n ´ 1 mem-
bers and each player has m actions, while the adver-
sary has only one action. The team utility is defined as
UT pa1, a2, . . . , an´1q “ 1 when a1 “ a2 “ . . . “ an´1
and 0 otherwise. Let us consider, in Line 1 of Algorithm 2, a
uniform sˆ prescribing to each team member to play each ac-
tion with probability 1m . The resolution of the LP of Line 4,
once fixed the strategy of one team member to such uni-
form distribution, would output the same uniform distribu-
tion for the other one. In other words, sˆ is a local maximum
for our algorithm. Thus, the algorithm would return a strat-
egy profile guaranteeing the team a payoff of mmn´1 “ 1mn´2
whereas the team–maxmin value amounts to 1 and can be
clearly obtained by any team profile in which both team
members play the same action in pure strategies. So the ap-
proximation factor achieved by the algorithm would be ex-
actly 1mn´2 .
Consider the case in which the initialization is pure. Con-
sider the game instance used in the proof of Theorem 1. If
the initialization is sˆ1 “ a2 and sˆ2 “ a4, the algorithm re-
turns 0, while the optimal value is 0.25. l
Team–maxmin value irrationality
In (Hansen et al. 2008), the authors consider the following
3–player game (we report only the utility of player 3):
2
a3 a4
1 a1 1 0
a2 0 0
a5
2
a3 a4
1 a1 0 0
a2 0 2
a6
3
and look for the minmax strategy of players 1 and 2 against
player 3. The authors claim that such a strategy is to play ac-
tions a1 and a3 with probability 2´
?
2, giving player 3 with
a utility of 6´4?2. This is not true, since, if players 1 and 2
play actions pa1, a4q or pa2, a3q, player 3 gains 0. Therefore,
the minmax strategy of players 1 and 2 against player 3 is to
play pa1, a4q or pa2, a3q.
In order to fix the proof, it is sufficient to change the sign
of the payoffs. Once the sign has been changed, the exam-
ple works for both the minmax strategy of players 1 and 2
against player 3 and the team–maxmin equilibrium where
players 1 and 2 compose the team. We report here all the
calculations—omitted in (Hansen et al. 2008)—for the case
of the team–maxmin equilibrium. To compute the team–
maxmin strategy of the team we need to solve the following
optimization problem:
max
s1pa1q,s2pa3q
v
s.t. v ď s1pa1qs2pa3q
v ď 2p1´ s1pa1qqp1´ s2pa3qq
s1pa1q P r0, 1s
s2pa3q P r0, 1s
Here, the maximum value is achieved when both inequalities
hold as equalities. Thus, we can write:
s1pa1qs2pa3q “ 2p1´ s1pa1qqp1´ s2pa3qq
from which it follows:
s1pa1q “ 2s2pa3q ´ 2
s2pa3q ´ 2 .
Now we write:
v “ s2pa3qp2s2pa3q ´ 2q
s2pa3q ´ 2 .
This expression is maximized for s2pa3q “ 2
?
2 and the
corresponding value is 6´ 4?2.
Additional experimental results
In this section we report additional experimental results we
obtained with specific classes of GAMUT games (Nudel-
man et al. 2004). We considered 3–Players games
from the following classes: Bertrand Oligopoly,
Dispersion Game, Minimum Effort Game, and
TravelersDilemma. In the following we report the aver-
age approximation factor, over 20 random instances for each
data point, obtained with BARON and the ratio between
BARON’s lower bound (corresponding to the best feasible
solution returned) and the utility value returned by other al-
gorithms. For Iterating LP we also display what obtained
with different numbers of restarts.
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Figure 4: Analysis of the approximation ratio obtained with BARON.
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Figure 5: Average approximation performance for Reconstrunction from correlated strategies w.r.t. BARON.
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Figure 6: Average approximation performance for Support enumeration w.r.t. BARON.
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(a) Bertrand Oligopoly.
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(b) Dispersion Game.
l ll l l
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
40 60 80 100
Number of actions
R
at
io
 (It
era
te
d 
LP
 / 
BA
RO
N)
Restarts:
l
l
1
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
(c) Minimum Effort Game.
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(d) TravelersDilemma.
Figure 7: Average approximation performance for Iterating linear programming w.r.t. BARON.
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Figure 8: Empiric Price of Uncorrelation.
